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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent, J
v.

:

ANITA CUBA WALKER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 870434-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of exploiting
prostitution, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. S 76-10-1305(1)(e) (1978).

This Court has jurisdiction to

hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp.
1989).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial to
sustain defendant's conviction for exploiting prostitution?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The applicable statutes for a determination of this
case are:
Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1301 (1978)i
(2) -House of Prostitution" means a place
where prostitution or promotion of
prostitution is regularly carried on by one
or more persons under the control,
management, or supervision of another.

Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1304 (1978)t
Aiding prostitution—(1). A person is guilty
of aiding prostitution if he:
(a) Solicits a person to patronize a
prostitute; or
(b) Procures or attempts to procure a
prostitute for a patron; or
(c) Leases or otherwise permits a place
controlled by the actor, alone or in
association with another, to be used for
prostitution or the promotion of
prostitution; or
(d) Solicits, receives, or agrees to
receive any benefit for doing any of the acts
prohibited by this subsection.
(2) Aiding prostitution is a class B
misdemeanor, provided that a second
conviction under this section shall be a
class A misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305 (1978)t
Exploiting prostitution.—(1) A person is
guilty of exploiting prostitution if he:
(a) Procures an inmate for a house of
prostitution or place in a house of
prostitution for one who would be an inmate;
or
(b) Encourages, induces, or otherwise
purposely causes another to become or remain
a prostitute; or
(c) Transports a person into or within
this state with a purpose to promote that
person's engaging in prostitution or
procuring or paying for transportation with
that purpose; or
(d) Not being a child or legal dependent
of a prostitute, shares the proceeds of
prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to
their understanding that he is to share
therein.
(e) Owns, controls, manages, supervises,
or otherwise keeps, alone or in association
with another, a house of prostitution or a
prostitution business.
(2) Exploiting prostitution is a felony of
the third degree.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Anita Cuba Walker, was charged with
exploiting prostitution, a third degree felony, in violation of
-2-

Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1305(1)(e) (1978) (R. 10-11).

On March

26, 1986, a jury trial commenced before the Honorable Raymond S.
Uno, Judge, Third Judicial District Court (R. 26, 135A, 132). On
April 2, 1986, a verdict of guilty was returned (R. 30-31; R. 134
at 80).

On May 16, 1986, defendant was sentenced to the

statutory term of zero to five years at the Utah State Prison.
The sentence was stayed and defendant was placed on supervised
probation for a period of eighteen months under specified terms
and conditions (R. 114).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Beginning in 1978, defendant, Anita Cuba Walker,
operated a message parlor called the Health and Herb Store in
Salt Lake County (R. 135 at 24).

Defendant was a licensed

massage technician (R. 135 at 36). Throughout the period in
question, defendant properly renewed her various business
licenses (R. 135 at 24, 33-34).
In February, 1985, defendant hired Debbie Shire (R. 135
at 105). At the time, Debbie was convicted of a felony, forgery,
and residing in the Residential Community Treatment Center (halfway house) (R. 134 at 62; R. 135 at 46).

When defendant hired

Debbie, defendant told her that her job was to "give the hand
jobs, the blow jobs, or the lay" (R. 135 at 108). Defendant told
Debbie that she charged "$40 for a hand job and that she charged
$60 for a blow job and $80 for a lay" (R. 135 at 108). From
these amounts, defendant told Debbie that "on the $40 hand job,
she was to get $20 and [Debbie] would keep $20 ... on the $60
blow job, she was to get $25 and [Debbie] was to get $35 ... on

-3-

the $80 layr she was to get $35 and [Debbie] was to get $45" (R.
135 at 111-12) • To Hkeep track of the different men that came in
and what they had", defendant maintained a card file system (R.
135 at 118).

Defendant instructed Debbie that the cards were to

be filled out with the name of the client, a brief physical
description of the client, the date and nature of the sexual act
performed, and the amount of money from the act retained by
defendant (R. 135 at 108-10, 116, 133, 138). The sexual acts
were not referred to by name on the cards but in code; Ma little
4 ... would be for a hand job ... a slanted slash would be for a
blow job ... a straight slash would be for a lay" (R. 135 at
116).
Debbie Shire remained employed by defendant as a
prostitute until her arrest in mid-August, 1985 (R. 135 at 112;
R. 134 at 32).

Throughout these months, Debbie continued to work

in the same manner as described in her first conversation with
defendant in that after each act of prostitution, Debbie recorded
the acts and information required in the card file system.
Throughout this time, Debbie continued to share her earnings from
prostitution with defendant as directed (R. 134 at 32).
As Debbie described it, "[defendant] hired me to do
acts of prostitution. ...
whole time" (R. 134 at 58).

That was the same job that I did the
While usually the specific sexual

act to be performed was left up to the client and Debbie, at
times defendant told Debbie what sex act to perform with a
particular customer (R. 134 at 60-61).

Debbie also at times

charged a customer either more or less than the prices set by
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defendant (R. 134 at 61). But, whenever Debbie performed acts of
prostitution, she gave part of the money to defendant (R. 134 at
32).
Because Debbie had to show legitimate employment to her
supervisor at the halfway house, she applied for a license as
masseuse, listing herself on the application as an employee of
defendant's Health and Herb Store (R. 134 at 40). Additionally,
defendant supplied Debbie with receipts and checks purportedly
showing that Debbie rented space and equipment from defendant as
a legitimate masseuse (R. 134 at 41).

Debbie admitted that these

were lies (R. 134 at 42). Her only work at defendant's
establishment was as a prostitute (R. 134 at 32, 58).
In addition to Debbie, defendant had at least three
other employees at the Health and Herb Store.

One was her son's

nineteen year old girlfriend, Jenny, who worked in the office and
did not do massages (R. 134 at 64-65).

Another was Dorothy or

Doris, a women in her fifties, who performed acupressure massages
that did not involve sexual acts (R. 134 at 65-66; R. 135 at 49).
A third was Suzi, a women in her early twenties, who performed
"pleasure massagefs]" which consisted of sexual acts (R. 135 at
49).
On August 9, 1985, Gerald W. Chatelain, Jr., a
correctional technician for the Department of Corrections, went
to defendant's business.

His purpose was to verify the nature of

Debbie Shire's employment at the Health and Herb Store.

This was

part of his normal duties at the Residential Community Treatment
Center where he worked (R. 135 at 46).

5-

Mr. Chatelain arrived at defendant's at approximately
9:45 p.m. and was greeted by defendant (R. 135 at 47-48).
else was immediately present.

No one

As Mr. Chatelain entered, he

hesitated, "trying to determine what type of business it was" (R.
135 at 48). Defendant immediately asked, "Have you ever been in
a massage parlor before?" (R. 135 at 48). When Mr. Chatelain
said no, defendant said, "Well, we have two types of massages:
one for relaxation and one for pleasure" (R. 135 at 48).
Defendant continued to explain that the "relaxation massage" was
basically an acupressure to relax the client and make him feel
good.

It would last approximately fifteen to twenty minutes.

Afterwards, defendant told Mr. Chatelain he could have a
"pleasure massage" (R. 135 at 48).
Mr. Chatelain and defendant proceeded to another room,
called the "red room" by defendant (R. 135 at 49). Two women
identified as Doris and Suzi were present.

Defendant told Mr.

Chatelain that Doris would perform the "relaxation massage" and
Suzi would do the "pleasure massage" (R. 135 at 49). At that
point, Suzi nodded affirmatively in Mr. Chatelain's direction (R,
135 at 92). Mr. Chatelain asked what a "pleasure massage"
involved.

Defendant responded, "Well, that could be either a

hand job or a french, which is a blow job, as we call it, or [Mr.
Chatelain] could get laid" (R. 135 at 49J.1

Defendant told Mr.

Defendant asserts in her brief that Mr. Chatelain could not
remember defendant's exact words to him (Br. of App. at 4). To
the contrary, Mr. Chatelain testified that because he knew the
significance of defendant's representations, he immediately wrote
down the terms used upon leaving defendant's business (R. 135 at
61-62).
-6-

Chatelain that the "relaxation massage" would cost $35 and the
2
"pleasure massage" would be $85 (R. 135 at 50).

Mr. Chatelain

pretended that his wallet was outside, left defendant's business
and called the Sheriff's Office (R. 135 at 50-51).
During the trial, approximately twenty of the file
cards, described by Debbie Shire as maintained by defendant, were
introduced into evidence.

(Exhibits 2-B, 2-C, 2-E, 2-J, 8, 9,

11, 13, 14, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 31, 35, 39; R. 135 at
134-35, 140-47).

These exhibits came from boxes sized from

defendant's kitchen in the Health and Herb Store building
pursuant to search warrant (Exhibits 2 and 2-A; R. 135 at 40,
43).

The validity of the seizure is not in question (R. 135 at

41).

Altogether, the boxes contained "a couple of hundred"

similar cards (R. 134 at 50).

However, based on the objections

of defense counsel, the only cards specifically discussed were
those in the handwriting of Debbie Shire (R. 132). Debbie Shire
testified that each of the cards introduced contained information
concerning the sex act performed by Debbie and the amount of
money from the sex act retained by defendant.

In some cases,

defendant was present when Debbie filled out the cards.
at 54-56).

(R. 134

But in all cases, Debbie only filled out the cards

because defendant had told her to maintain the cards and
information as part of the record keeping of defendant's business
(R. 135 at 118; R. 134 at 32).
Mr. Chatelain testified that the amount was $85 but conceded
that the sheriff's report of his encounter said $80. Mr.
Chatelain also testified that he may have testified at the
preliminary hearing to $80 (R. 135 at 83-84).
7

Defendant presented no witnesses on her behalf (R. 134
at 69).

However, at the close of the evidence, defendant did

move the trial court for a directed verdict of acquittal based on
insufficient evidence (R. 134 at 76).
134 at 78-9).

The motion was denied (R.

Additionally, defendant renewed her motion to

dismiss the information which had been made and denied pretrial
(R. 132; R. 134 at 78). Defendant argued that the misdemeanor
statute of aiding prostitution, Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1304(1)(c)
(1978), covered the same criminal conduct as the felony charge of
exploiting prostitution, Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1305(1)(e) (1978)
(R. 132 at 10-19).

As such, defendant argued that she was

entitled to either a dismissal of the information or a reduction
of the charge to a misdemeanor (R. 132 at 11).

The motion was

denied (R. 134 at 78-9).
Despite defendant's position that the charge should
have been reduced to a misdemeanor, she did not seek any lesser
included instruction to that effect (R. 134 at 72).

Defendant's

requested instructions were given, given as modified or given in
substance (R. 134 at 72-3).

Defendant made exceptions to some

instructions, but not to the verdict form (R. 134 at 71-2, 74-5,
96-97, 100). No issue is raised on appeal as to the jury
instructions.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The evidence presented at trial, together with all
reasonable inferences, is sufficient to sustain defendant's
felony conviction of exploiting prostitution.

-8-

The felony statute of exploiting prostitution is not
wholly duplicative of the misdemeanor statute of aiding
prostitution; and, therefore, defendant is not entitled to a
reduction of her conviction.
Even assuming arguendo that the statutes were
duplicative, the remedy would not be to wholly vacate defendant's
conviction but to remand the case for resentencing of defendant
under the misdemeanor statute and penalty.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL TOGETHER WITH
ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES IS SUFFICIENT TO
SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF EXPLOITING
PROSTITUTION.
Defendant contends that the evidence adduced at trial
is insufficient to support her conviction of exploiting
prostitution as defined under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(1)
(1978) which reads:
A person is guilty of exploiting prostitution
if he:
•

• •

(e) Owns, controls, manages, supervises,
or otherwise keeps, alone or in association
with another, a house of prostitution or a
prostitution business.
House of prostitution means:
a place where prostitution or promotion of
prostitution is regularly carried on by one
or more persons under the control,
management, or supervision of another.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1301(2) (1978).3

Prostitution is

Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1301 was amended in 1987 and 1988.
Reference will be made to the 1978 definitions in effect at the
time of defendant's trial.
-9-

statutorily defined in pertinent part as:
engag[ing] or offer[ing] or agree[ing] to
engage in any sexual activity with another
person for a fee.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1302(1)(a) (1978).

Sexual activity means:

intercourse or any sexual act involving the
genitals of one person and the mouth or anus
of another person, regardless of the sex of
either participant.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1301(1) (1978).

Here, the jury was fully

advised as to each requisite element of the offense. (See Court's
Instructions to the Jury, Instructions 14-19; R. 86-91.) No
4
issue has been raised on appeal as to the instructions.
The standard for review for a sufficiency of the
evidence challenge is well-established by the Utah Appellate
Courts.
[T]he evidence and the reasonable inferences
which may be drawn therefrom must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the jury
verdict. A jury conviction is reversed for
insufficient evidence only when the evidence,
so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted.
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989).
v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Accord State
Further,

since a jury is in the best position to give proper weight to the
peripheral nature of [any] contradictory testimony", State v.
Without directly challenging any instruction, defendant
claims that the jury was "confused" as to the elements required
for conviction (Br. of App. at 23). Such is not the case. The
jury while in deliberations did make a request of the court for
clarification of an instruction. Before the court could tell the
jury "to use their own judgment", the jury informed the court
that they had "resolved that particular question" (R. 134 at 85).
-10-

Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1988):
It is not this court's duty to measure
conflicting evidence or the credibility of
witnesses. That responsibility belongs
strictly to the trier of fact. 'It is the
exclusive function of the jury to weigh the
evidence and determine the credibility of the
witnesses' . . . . So long as there is some
evidence, including reasonable inferences,
from which findings of all requisite elements
of the crime can reasonably be made, [the
court's] inquiry stops . . . .
Id. at 27, quoting State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)
(citations omitted).

Accord State v. Hopkins, 119 Utah Adv. Rep.

59 (1989).
Turning to the facts established at trial and their
reasonable inferences, it is clear that defendant operated a
massage parlor called the Herb and Health Store in Salt Lake
County (R. 135 at 24, 33-4, 36). It is equally clear that
beginning in February, 1985 and continuing through August 9,
1985, defendant in addition to legitimate massages offered her
clientele prostitution services (R. 134 at 32, 58; R. 135 at 4650, 108). Debbie Shire, under a grant of immunity, testified
that she was hired exclusively as a prostitute by defendant (R.
135 at 108). Not only did Debbie perform sexual acts for
defendant's clients but did so at defendant's direction and with
defendant's approval and knowledge (R. 134 at 32, 58). The
general prices for the sexual acts were initially set by
defendant even though Debbie did vary from the set prices on
occasion (R. 135 at 108, 11-12; R. 134 at 61). Defendant also
required Debbie to maintain a card file on the clients, including
information on the sexual acts performed (R. 135 at 116-18).

11-

Defendant required a set share of any monies received by Debbie
for each sexual act (R. 135 at 111-12).
The evidence of the cards themselves established the
illicit nature of defendant's business.

Defendant directed the

cards to be maintained in code, Ma little 4 ... for a hand job
... a slanted slash ... for a blow job ... a straight slash ...
for a layM (R. 135 at 116). The cards not only tracked the
clientele that participated in sexual activity but allowed for an
accounting of defendant's share of the monies earned from the
prostitution business (R. 135 at 133, 138).
The direct control, management and supervision by
defendant of her prostitution business was further established by
Gerald Chatelain's encounter with defendant on August 9, 1985 (R.
135 at 46-50).

Immediately upon entering defendant's business

and without knowing anything about its illicit nature, Mr.
Chatelain was offered the services of another prostitute (R. 135
at 47-49).

It was defendant who initiated the offer, defendant

who directed who would service Mr. Chatelain, both legitimately
and illegitimately, and defendant who set the price to be charged
(R. 135 at 49-50).
Taken as a whole, the evidence clearly supports the
jury's conclusion that defendant owned, controlled, managed or
supervised a Mhouse of prostitution or prostitution business" in
addition to any legal massage services she offered.

It was

defendant who established which employees would act as
prostitutes.

It was defendant who set forth the duties and

procedures to be followed.

Applying the proper standard of

12-

review, the evidence is sufficient to sustain defendant's
conviction of exploiting prostitution.
POINT II
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO HAVE HER
CONVICTION VACATED AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Defendant argues that even if she did commit the acts
charged, she is entitled to have her conviction vacated on the
grounds that her conduct is similarly covered by two statutes,
one a felony and one a misdemeanor (Br. of App. at 21-26).
Specifically, defendant contends that the misdemeanor offense of
aiding prostitution, Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1304(1)(c) (1978), is
duplicative of the felony offense of exploiting prostitution,
Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1305(1)(e) (1978), of which defendant
stands convicted.

Further, defendant argues that since she did

not ask for a lesser included instruction on the misdemeanor
charge, this Court is precluded from reducing defendant's
conviction or correcting her sentence (Br. of App. at 25-26).
According to defendant, the only remedy if the statutes are
viewed as duplicative is to vacate defendant's conviction
entirely.

Defendant's argument is not supported by the plain

meaning of the statutes.
Defendant was charged under subsection (e) of Utah Code
Ann. S 76-10-1305(1) wherein a person is guilty of exploiting
prostitution if he:
Owns, controls, manages, supervises, or
otherwise keeps, alone or in association with
another, a house of prostitution or a
prostitution business.

-13-

Prior to 1974, this language of subsection (e) of the exploiting
prostitution statute was contained as a separate subsection in
the misdemeanor aiding prostitution statute.

All other current

subsections of the aiding prostitution and exploiting
prostitution statutes remained unchanged.

However, in 1974, the

Utah legislature amended the prostitution statute in conjunction
with numerous other amendments to the then newly enacted 1973
5
Criminal Code. While no legislative history is available
discussing the prostitution statute amendment, it is clear from
the nature of the amendment itself that the Utah legislature
determined that the type of conduct which had been classified as
a misdemeanor previously should be classified as a felony.

The

amendment in effect deleted one method of violating the aiding
statute by reclassifying that means of criminal conduct as a
felony.

As noted recently by the Utah Supreme Court, it is the

legislature's prerogative to define the elements and degree of
punishment for a criminal offense.

State v. Moore, No. 870470,

slip op. at 7, 12 (Utah, Oct. 25, 1989).
Defendant attempts to overcome this Court's deference
to the legislative function by claiming that the two statutes now
punish the same conduct and therefore under State v. Shondel, 22
Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), defendant is entitled to
the lesser penalty (Br. of App. at 22-23).

The State, both at

trial and on appeal, recognizes that if the statutes do in fact
The amendments were grouped together as H.B. 31. The tapes of
the committee meetings on H.B. 31 are no longer available. The
discussions at the time of passage of the bill are available. A
review of those tapes does not reveal any discussion of the
prostitution statute amendment.
-14-

punish the same criminal act, defendant as a matter of law should
be subject only to the lesser punishment (R. 132 at 12).
However, contrary to defendant's assertion, State v.
Shondel does not stand for the general proposition that:
where there is doubt or uncertainty as to
which of two punishments is applicable to an
offense, an accused is entitled to the
benefit of the lesser.
453 P.2d at 148 (Br. of App. at 22-23).
much narrower.

Rather its holding is

As stated by the Utah Supreme Court:

We held in State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343,
435 P.2d 146 (1969), that if two statutes are
wholly duplicative as to the elements of the
crime, the law does not permit a prosecutor
to exercise the wholly unfettered authority
to decide whether the crime should be charged
as a misdemeanor or a felony.
State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added).
Accord State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982, 987 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
("the application of Shondel is limited to situations where the
statutes at issue are 'wholly duplicative as to the elements of
the crime'").

The issue then is whether the statutory

definitions of aiding prostitution and exploiting prostitution
"proscribe exactly the same conduct, i.e., do they contain the
same elements?".

State v. Gomez, 722 P.2d 747, 749 (Utah 1986).

The two sections in question are subsection (e) of the
exploiting prostitution statute under which defendant was
convicted:
A person is guilty of exploiting prostitution
if he:
(e) Owns, controls, manages, supervises, or
otherwise keeps, alone or in association with
another, a house of prostitution or a
prostitution business;
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Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1305(1); and, subsection (c) of the aiding
prostitution statute under which:
A person is guilty of aiding prostitution if
he:
(c) Leases or otherwise permits a place
controlled by the actor, alone or in
association with another, to be used for
prostitution or the promotion of
prostitution.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1304(1).
Initially, the sections appear to be very similar.
Both require the joint action of two parties, a "manager" and a
prostitute.

Both require the defendant to actually know that

prostitution is occurring.
apparent.

But then some differences become

Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1304(1)(c), the aiding

prostitution statute, requires that a defendant have control of
the place of the prostitution, but not necessarily of the
prostitution itself.

For example, a motel manager who allows a

prostitute to rent a room, knowing that the room is being used
for prostitution would be guilty of the misdemeanor of aiding
prostitution.

On the other hand, Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-

1305(1)(e), the felony statute, appears to require a defendant to
be actively involved in the running of the prostitution business
itself.

The felony statute would cover the more criminally

culpable conduct of being a "pimp" or "madam", as is the case
here.

As such, the legislative purpose in distinguishing between

the penalties for the two statutes becomes clear.

A prostitute acting alone could not be convicted under either
statute. Rather, her conduct would be criminally punishable
under Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1302(1978); and, her customer's
conduct under Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1303 (1978).
16-

The distinction between the elements of the two
statutes becomes even sharper when all language of each
subsection is considered.

Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1304(1)(c)

prohibits the leasing or otherwise permitting of a place "for
prostitution or the promotion of prostitution".

Prostitution is

defined under Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1302 (1978) as being the act
of engaging in sexual activity for a fee.
require a regular course of conduct.
if done for money is sufficient.

Prostitution does not

Rather, a single sexual act

Thus, under the misdemeanor

aiding prostitution statute a defendant may be convicted for
permitting a single act of prostitution.

Here, if the only

evidence against defendant was her encounter with Gerald
Chatelain, she would have only been guilty of aiding
prostitution.
Just as distinctly, Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1305(1)(e)
requires that before a person may be convicted of exploiting
prostitution, it must be established that he controlled, managed
or supervised a "house of prostitution or a prostitution
business".

A "house of prostitution" is defined as "a place

where prostitution or promotion of prostitution is regularly
carried on by one or more persons under the control, management,
or supervision of another", Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1301(2) (1978)
(emphasis added).
for conviction.

A single act of prostitution is insufficient
Instead, the State must show, as it did here,

that the defendant was supervising a regularly conducted business
of prostitution.

(See Point I, supra, for discussion of

sufficiency of evidence of exploiting prostitution.)
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Therefore,

State v. Shondel is inapplicable because

the elements of the two statutes in question are not -wholly
duplicative".

Accord State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988)

(sexual abuse of a child is not duplicative of sexual
exploitation of a child); State v. Clark, 632 P.2d 841 (Utah
1981) (theft of livestock is merely more specific and therefore
separate crime from theft);

State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161

(Utah 1980) (theft by deception and deceptive business practices
are distinct crimes); Helmuth v. Morris, 598 P.2d 333 (Utah 1979)
7
(presenting a false prescription is not duplicitive of forgery).
But, even if the statutes are considered duplicative,
the remedy proposed by defendant is inappropriate.

Defendant

In interpreting these subsections, it is well to keep in mind
that Utah does not follow the rule of strict construction. State
v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1046 (Utah 1984); Utah Code Ann. § 761-106 (1978). Instead, Utah Appellate Courts have steadfastly
recognized their primary duty in construing legislation is to
determine and give effect to the legislative intent. Murray City
v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah 1983); Bd. of Educ. of Granite
School Dist. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah
1983); Christensen v. Industrial Commission, 642 P.2d 755, 756
(Utah 1982). Consistent with this approach:
Statutes are considered to be in pari materia
and thus must be construed together when they
relate to the same person or thing, to the
same class of persons or things, or have the
same purpose or object. If it is natural or
reasonable to think that the understanding of
the legislature or of persons affected by the
statute would be influenced by another
statute# then those statutes should be
construed to be in pari materia, construed
with reference to one another and harmonized
if possible.
Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1985). Accord,
Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318; State v. Bishop, 753
P.2d 439, 479-480. A statute must be interpreted and applied in
light of its purpose, State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794, 797 (Utah
1977); and, accorded every presumption of validity, Timpanogos
Planning v. Central Utah Water, 690 P.2d 562, 564 (Utah 1984).
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argues that unless she requests a reduction, this Court is
without authority to reduce her conviction and remand the case
for appropriate resentencing as a misdemeanor (Br. of App. at 2526).

Defendant claims that under State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d

1214 (Utah 1985), a defendant's conviction may be reduced only if
a defendant requests a lesser included instruction at trial or
requests a reduction on appeal.

Such is clearly not the law. An

appellate court may reduce a conviction to a lesser included
offense whenever the fact-finder would have necessarily found
defendant guilty of the requisite elements of the lesser offense.
State v. Bindrup, 655 P.2d 674 (Utah 1982).

An appellate court

may also reduce a conviction where, as here, defendant requests a
new trial and admits in her appellate brief that the evidence if
believed would constitute a violation of the lesser offense.
State v. Devlin, 699 P.2d 717 (Utah 1985).

Defendant's reliance

on Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-402(5) (1978) is misplaced.

The statute

has never been interpreted to preclude post-conviction reduction
absent a request of defendant.
1214, 1221.

State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d

Rather, if defendant seeks to set aside her

conviction, a reduction may be entered if consistent with the
evidence at trial.
Further, defendant's argument is logically
inconsistent.

For if, as a matter of law, exploiting

prostitution is duplicative of aiding prostitution, then the jury
necessarily found defendant guilty of both offenses, i.e., the
elements would necessarily be "wholly duplicative1'.

Defendant's

conviction would stand but her punishment could only be the
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lesser of the two statutes.

Therefore, even accepting arguendo

defendant's contention as to duplication, the proper remedy and
the only remedy considered under State v. Shondel would be to
remand the case for resentencing as a Class B misdemeanor.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction and
sentence for exploiting prostitution should be affirmed.
DATED this *3cU^ day of October, 1989.
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